Analysis of a new Facebook phish

Beware of this wall post!

I just posted an article for Blogsecurify about a new Facebook phish that I stumbled upon. Thanks again to Greg and Tyler for helping out with some of the detailed analysis! You guys rock!

LinkedIn Apps Announced

Posted originally on Neohaxor.org, re-posted with permission:

Business social network LinkedIn announced their LinkedIn Applications today. The applications directory can be viewed here There are only several applications to chose from at the moment. I am sure that number will grow soon. LinkedIn uses Google’s OpenSocial just like other social networks such as MySpace, Orkut, hi5, etc. I only spent like 5 minutes looking at a couple of things. So, the following are only my quick thoughts and impressions.

The applications are delivered though the domain lmodules.com. This makes them easy to identify and block if that’s what you would like to do.

At first glance it appears that the vetting process for LinkedIn is higher than some of the other social networks. They appear to only want known businesses to create applications for their network at this time. This would help root out some possible malicious users. A vetting process is a good first step in thwarting that type of malicious behavior. I didn’t look at the difficulty in attaining a developer account, but I am assuming it is much more difficult than other social networks like MySpace, Facebok, etc. Now, whether this vetting process will stay this stringent will remain to be seen. These procedures may be relaxed in the future due to demand.

Just because the name has changed doesn’t mean the threats have changed. As a matter of fact there may actually be more on the table. Business networks such as LinkedIn are more likely to contain real information about people vs other non-professional social networks. Not that people don’t share enough about their real self on other social networks. This means the same threats exist for the capture of information as on other social networks.

There are still technical threats from social network applications on LinkedIn as well. These are the very same issues as other social networks that we have discussed in the past and demonstrated. Malware distribution, social engineering, attacking clients, information harvesting, click fraud are just some of these threats from social network applications. Moral of the story is be careful. Don’t install apps you don’t need, even though you may do so on your iPhone ;)

So all in all the threats are the same with LinkedIn as any other social networks that employ applications. However, with a more stringent vetting process this should reduce the possibilities for malicious by making accounts harder to get.

Facebook Privacy & Security Guide Released

Today at the Ohio Information Security Summit I released my Facebook Security & Privacy Guide. This guide gives you suggested “baseline” security settings that you can use when configuring your Facebook account. Obviously, you can adjust these settings based on your own level of risk but it should give you a good starting point.

How did this project get started?
I have been doing several months of research with my own Facebook account as well as gathering the input of other Facebook users to determine what the privacy and security settings would be without loosing the key features of using a social network website…the networking!

Please feel free to distribute this document to friends and family or use it for any security awareness campaigns. I will hopefully be keeping up with any updates to the document when Facebook changes things. I might be putting together a similar document together for MySpace but MySpace is a totally different animal altogether. We shall see! :-)

You can download a pdf version of the guide here.

Exploiting trust in social networks

Over the weekend I posted my first article on Social Network/Media security over at Blogsecurify. You can check out the post here. My next article will talk about the security of third-party applications and widgets for social media applications.

Attacking Password Resets w/ Social Networks

Posted originally on Neohaxor.org, re-posted with permission:


Password Reset: Your passport to a fuxored account.

Password Reset Methods Vulnerable? Really? Get out of here, you mean that many password reset methods are vulnerable to attack? You have to be kidding. The fact that people think vulnerable password reset is newsworthy have got to be crazy. This is something that many of us have been talking about for years. Now Sarah Palin’s email gets attacked and it is big deal. It amazes me why we always wait to get screwed by something before we fix it.

Why does everything in the security world have to be a response to something. Ok, not the security world but the business security world. They are definitely two different entities. I am truly tired of reactive security. Just think if other professions followed this reactive model, like a cop asking for a bullet proof vest after they have already been shot. Nobody can say they didn’t see this coming either. People make more of their life known through social networks, photo sharing, and blogs than ever before. The simple password reset questions just don’t hold up.

There is a lot of unnecessary fear about data from social networks being used to steal someone’s identity. Although this is mostly FUD, social networks can be a great source for password recovery data. A while back we recovered a password (with his permission of course) from my friend Brian’s Sprint account using data from his MySpace page. This is when we were first starting our research for the social network hacking project.

Let’s take a step back from social networks for a sec, would your friends, co-workers, significant other, etc. be able to recover your password with the information they know about you? If the answer to that question is yes, then you need to change something. Passwords should be something that you know, not you and a couple of other people.

What Types of Data are on Social Networks?

The information that people put on their social network pages range from minimal to wildly over the top. Some people even go above and beyond by posting survey questions that tell a lot about their personalities. Although they want to show off the depth of their personality, all it really does is show off the shallowness of their brain.

Social networks by their default nature basically allow you to “friend” the world. The information on people’s social network page typically contains information that was previously only known to traditional friends and acquaintances. This can be a huge problem for the password reset mechanism, not to mention a person’s privacy. If it’s deep and kinda scary from a privacy standpoint then it is probably on a social network. Remember when I mentioned if your friends knew enough about you to reset your password then you are in trouble, well you just friended the world with the information from your social network profile. Beyond standard profile information there are a users actions taken on a social network site and possibly social network applications that are being used as well. All of this information can be leveraged when attacking a password reset mechanisms.

You can use an email address to look up people’s accounts on social networking sites. On the flip side, someone social network profile might directly tell you a person’s email address or you can use the search features of the social network to query owner’s of certain email addresses. There are no secrets in social networking ;)

Email Accounts are Gold

With password resets an email account is really the jackpot. Many password reset mechanisms, including the ones from social networks, rely on sending either the password or a temporary password to the email address of the account owner. Someone who gets their email account compromised might just find that they have every other account tied to that email account compromised as well. I mean, it wouldn’t be a far stretch to figure that out once someone had access to the email account. Just think of all the crap that sites like Amazon, eBay, MySpace, Facebook, etc. send to your email account.

Typical Password Questions

Typical password recovery questions really vary in complexity from site to site. What is the problem with password recovery questions in general? Well, they are not typically made up of data that is private. Unlike a password which is supposed to be something that only you know, recovery questions may be known to many people around you.

Here are some questions from Yahoo:

  • Where did you meet your spouse?
  • What was the name of your first school?
  • Who was your childhood hero?
  • What is your favorite pastime?
  • What is your favorite sports team?
  • What is your father’s middle name?
  • What was your hight school mascot?
  • What make was your first car or bike?
  • What is your pets name?

Some of these questions look like questions that social networks ask when you are filling out a profile, don’t they? If not questions they ask, certainly data that people put on their social network profiles or divulge through other means on a social network.

The Obvious

Take a glance at someone’s profile or maybe your profile on a social network. From just this page without further probing there may be an enormous amount of information. Depending on the mechanism that is being attacked, it may be all that is needed. Here is an example of some of the things that may be found just on the profile page:

  • Name
  • Date of Birth
  • Hometown
  • Current town
  • Favorite movies, artists, music, people, TV, sports teams, etc
  • High School
  • College
  • Personal description
  • Personality traits
  • Networks and Groups
  • Relationship information
  • Family information
  • Employer

The list really goes on and on. Remember that many people are on multiple social networks. Checking out other social networks may fill in the blanks. It is easy to see why this information could be a problem and I don’t think it needs any further explanation.

The Not So Obvious

Some data is not so obvious and might not be directly spelled out. This may be information that has to be aggregated or inferred from the profile data, friends list, blog, group, network, etc.

  • Photos and photo tags
  • Comments on other profiles
  • Photo data (cloths, background, other individuals, etc)
  • Pets
  • Children
  • Siblings
  • Relatives (potentially ones with your mother’s maiden name?)
  • Potential usernames
  • Instant messenger data
  • Blogs and comments in friends’ blogs
  • Favorite teachers
  • Sexual preference
  • Religious views
  • Political views

The data is really limitless, but after all isn’t that what a nice web 2.0 application is supposed to provide? On the surface some of this data may seem silly for password resets but it is really not. This not so obvious information can be really helpful when when non-standard questions are used in the password reset process. This typically happens when people are left to their own devices when creating security questions. They typically create questions that are common and familiar to them. Stupid things like pet’s names, favorite teams, favorite TV shows, etc.

Just think for a moment about tagging. People may tag photos themselves with useful information. Also, friends may tag people in photos helping better define a person’s relationships with people and activities they are involved in. The URL of the social network may lead you to potential usernames / IM information such as www.myspace.com/(username). Maybe the data is completely visual like photo data. A lot of information can be obtained by looking at pictures. Favorite places, sports teams, cars, and countless other possibilities. You name it, people like pictures with their favorite things.

The actions people take on social networks helps better define relationships, networks, group affiliations, and activities. The person may place comments on other people’s photos, profiles, walls, blogs, etc. You may see comments like “That is why you are my BFF”. You may also see that someone is a member of a political party or religious group. People may discuss on boards or blogs about certain things happening in their life. Sharing is caring right?

So what you get in the end is a clear picture of who these people are. You get their likes, dislikes, friends, and affiliations are all in a nice clean package. You may have never even met this person but you have all of the information a traditional friend may have, possibly more.

Need a bit more?

If you almost have the nail in the coffin then you can turn to other sites to complete the task. You could look for name / username collisions on other sites to gain more data. You could take their high school and age information and find out who they went to school with. The possibilities are endless.

The User’s Choice

When people are given the option to choose their own security it has historically been bad. There is nothing that seems to suggest that allowing user’s to choose their security will get any better, so some of this may be wasted breath.

When looking at sites like Google, it seems they have slightly better security questions. Questions such as your library card number, frequent flyer number, etc. I think sites like these with better security questions probably have a high amount of people that end up just choosing their own questions when this option is available. People don’t seem to understand that this isn’t a function that you are going to use everyday. It is ok and preferable to use data that you may not be able to recall without looking up.

So What Can We Do?

The problem of personal data leakage isn’t going to stop until people realize the potential impacts of their data being strung out for the whole world to see. I personally don’t think this will change, in fact, I think with time it will get a lot worse. We live in this voyeuristic, virtual world where people create digital representations of how they see themselves. I think that has an appeal to many people, especially those who don’t particularly find their lives that exciting.

Don’t play by the rules when dealing with a sites password reset questions. Put blatantly wrong, hard to guess, or nonsensical information in to the answer blocks. This will make any information gathered on you useless when attempting to recover your password.

It seems that many sites want you to log in. You shouldn’t use the same password on every site. Use a trusted password safe such as KeePass to store your login credentials. KeePass is open source and multi-platform. Using a mechanism like this allows you to be in control of your password recovery along with allowing you to use different passwords for different sites. It would also be a good idea to back up the database of whatever password safe you choose to use as well. Just a thought ;)

The biggest mistake someone can make is thinking that there is nobody out there that gives enough of a crap about them to attack their accounts. People do weird things. Anybody is capable of just about anything. This isn’t being paranoid, it’s being safe. Think of it as locking the door on your house when you leave, only instead of your valuables you are protecting your data.

Malware on Twitter

Well, it seems like it didn’t take that long for the malware authors to notice the opportunity in abusing Twitter as a malware distribution platform.
According to Kaspersky Labs:
“…This profile has obviously been created especially for infecting users, as there is no other data except the photo, which contains the link to the video.

If you click on the link, you get a window that shows the progress of an automatic download of a so-called new version of Adobe Flash which is supposedly required to watch the video. You end up with a file labeled Adobe Flash (it’s a fake) on your machine; a technique that is currently very popular…”

Unfortunately, the auto-follow-me vulnerability is still exploitable for Internet Explorer users. I’m still withholding the technical details of this vulnerability in a hope that it won’t be exploited in the wild, more than it was probably already did.

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