More Changes to Facebook Privacy, and More to Come

Yesterday, Facebook announced two new features: Community Pages and “connections” for certain profile information. The first combines some of the generic fan pages that have become popular over the last few months with Wikipedia articles to create a sort of social encyclopedia. I’m not entirely clear on what Facebook envisions with this feature, but it will be interesting to watch it develop.

The second feature, however, has attracted much more attention, and rightfully so. I’m again still sorting through details and have not yet seen the new connections in action, but certain parts are pretty clear. Facebook is replacing the manual lists in parts of the “info” tab on your profile to lists of fan pages you connect with. Along with the new setup, Facebook is changing the “Become a Fan” buttons to “Like” buttons. If you want to connect with a page for something you’re interested in, you now will simply “like” the page.

In a blog post, Facebook spun the connections as an exciting improvement: “Instead of just boring text, these connections are actually Pages, so your profile will become immediately more connected to the places, things and experiences that matter to you.” I can see three main reasons why Facebook would make this change, and none of them involve text being boring.

First, this helps software more easily process your interests. With textual lists, you may find titles such as these under a user’s favorite movies: “LOTR,” “Lord of the Rings,” “Lord.Of.The.Rings,” “***Lord of the Rings!***”, “i just LOVE lord of the rings so much,” etc. It’s obvious to a human that these all refer to the same trilogy of movies, but not to a computer. By essentially turning sections of your profile into database relationships, Facebook can take all of these disparate descriptions and replace them all with a link to an official Lord of the Rings page.

Second, the shift to “liking” reduces friction. The semantics may be subtle, but I’m sure Facebook has done research on this. “Liking” implies a simple, casual gesture (represented by the thumbs up icon), while “becoming a fan” or “subscribing” carries more of a commitment and desire for further interaction. I’m guessing users are far more likely to say they “like” something than “become a fan” of it, and Facebook wants users to connect and share as much as possible.

Third, this increases the useful data Facebook can offer to others. It’s likely that a large majority of Facebook’s users currently have privacy settings that only allow friends to see the “boring text” in their profiles. But since last fall’s privacy changes, connections to fan pages are now considered publicly available information. By taking the simple step of “liking” a page, users will add an easily processed connection that certain sites and applications will be able to access when visited.

Since the new setup has obvious privacy implications, Facebook added privacy controls, but unfortunately, they seem to also add further confusion. As Facebook notes, the new settings relate only to profile visibility: “You can control which friends are able to see connections listed on your profile, but you may still show up on Pages you’re connected to.” This is yet another example of Facebook making information appear to be private without actually making it private. As TechCrunch writer Jason Kincaid put it well, “In short, this section is about the data on Facebook that you can’t actually control. You can make it harder to find, and even hide it from your profile, but you can’t remove it entirely.”

Facebook stands to gain enormously from users embracing these new profile connections, and fan pages within Facebook are only the beginning. Tomorrow is f8, a developer conference hosted by Facebook, and the company will likely be introducing several new features and plans, such as adding location information to wall posts. Inside Facebook has an excellent round-up of what to expect. Several of these changes will likely have a significant impact on user privacy; I expect we’ll hear more detail about pre-approved Facebook Connect sites gaining automatic access to user data. Another item of interest will be the Open Graph API, which takes the “liking” behavior described above and extends it to any website.

That means that rather than simply say you’re a fan of Social Hacking, for instance, you could potentially “like” In other words, you could create a connection between your profile and a given URI (website address). That opens up many new possibilities, but once again adds significant information to your public profile.

As I said, certain details are still not clear to me; for instance, Facebook seems to have backtracked on whether your list of friends is publicly available information, and says that fan page connections will not be public for minors. I’ll certainly be watching to see what Facebook announces tomorrow, and will likely have much more to say about it in the next week or so. (In fact, I’ve been holding off on a few posts until I see how the f8 announcements will impact the issues they deal with.) I should also have shorter, quicker updates throughout the day tomorrow on my Twitter feed.

Facebook Platform Vulnerability Enabled Silent Data Harvesting

A few weeks ago, I sent Facebook a demonstration of what appeared to be a previously unknown attack combining two behaviors of the Facebook Platform. The technique allowed one to create a seemingly innocent web page that would invisibly and silently steal a visitor’s private Facebook content. Facebook has now disabled the attack by modifying one of the exploited behaviors.

It’s unlikely that any real-world attacks used this particular vulnerability, and I certainly have no record of such a case. But it’s also unclear how long the problem has existed. I discovered one part of the technique, a “return_session” parameter for application authorization, while examining the behavior of the Yahoo! contact importer, which only launched a month ago. However, discussions on Facebook’s developer forum mention the parameter in the context of Facebook Connect implementations as far back as February 2009. The other main component, now modified by Facebook, may have existed since the beginning of the Platform in 2007.

In my proof-of-concept demonstration, I loaded a harmless-looking web page on a server external to Facebook. The page included code for an inline frame sized to be invisible to the user. This frame then loaded the login page for a Facebook application. If the user has already authorized an application, its login page will automatically forward to the application, and that’s exactly what I wanted to happen. I chose FarmVille for my demo, since it has a wide install base. Keep in mind that while FarmVille currently lists about 83 million monthly active users, the attack would have worked for anyone who has authorized the application, regardless of how long ago. The attack could also target multiple applications at once using multiple iframes, meaning nearly any of Facebook’s 400 million active users could have fallen prey.

But the first main component of the attack involved a slight modification to the login page URI. By adding a “next” parameter, one can specify an alternate landing page for authorized users. Not all applications take advantage of this parameter, but many do. The parameter would not work for an arbitrary site, but Facebook previously did allow any URI that began with Thus one could craft a login page URI that checked whether the user had authorized one application and then forward the user to a second application.

The next part of the attack came from adding “return_session=1″ to the login page URI. This parameter causes Facebook to append particular session variables for the authorized application onto the URI of the landing page – in our case, the second application given by the “next” parameter. That application merely has to check its address for the session data, which provides enough information to execute API requests using the credentials of the already authorized application. Since an authorized application essentially operates on behalf of a user, it has access to nearly all private profile information (essentially, everything but your e-mail address and phone number) and content (photos, links, notes, etc.) that can be loaded via the API, and hence the second application had such access as well. This entire process could be fully automated without any user interaction and did not require any authorization for the second application. Also, the attack could generally be executed quick enough to avoid Facebook’s measures for detecting when their pages are loaded in frames.

To patch the attack, Facebook has restricted the “next” parameter; it now only forwards to addresses for the application specified on the login page, preventing any appended session data from reaching the wrong destination. Since an authorized application already has API access, using return_session with that application will not add any new privileges.

I commend Facebook for responding quickly to this issue and for being open to white-hat security reports. But in my opinion, this vulnerability is simply the latest reminder that the Facebook Platform can open users to many problems quite separate from the security of Facebook itself. I personally think that aspects of the Platform’s implementation fail to match user expectations of privacy, as I’ve discussed previously. And while this particular problem may be solved, vulnerabilities in specific applications and the nature of application access continue to put private data at risk of unwanted disclosure.

Correction on Public Information Access by Facebook Applications

I don’t take my responsibility as a blogger lightly, and I realize that many readers look to this site for reliable information on privacy and security issues with social networking applications. Consequently, I strive to maintain high standards of accuracy and clarity in my posts. Over the last few years, I’ve set some personal rules for myself, such as reproducing a vulnerability before relaying it here. I would never want to mislead my readers or betray their trust.

However, I must issue an apology regarding what I view as a significant error that I discovered today while researching a new idea. In at least two recent posts, I misrepresented how much information Facebook applications are able to access without explicit authorization. My apologies to Facebook for overstating such access.

Previously, I’d stated that Facebook applications have access to your “publicly available information” and content marked accessible to “Everyone” prior to authorizing the application. In one case, I stated this could be used by a fan page tab to identify users without explicit authorization.

As it turns out, applications only have this automatic access in certain circumstances. According to Facebook’s documentation, such access only occurs when users arrive at an application page from certain Facebook channels and can be affected by strong privacy settings. I misunderstood this process and consequently applied in situations where it would not actually come into play.

As for fan pages, a tab apparently does not have automatic means of identifying a user and would need to request authentication to access such information.

It bothers no one more than me that I misled my readers on this point, and I will certainly strive all the more to avoid such an error in the future.

Dissecting a Typical Facebook Fan Page Scam

Update: I strive to maintain accuracy on my blog and spend time verifying issues before posting them. However, further investigation has led me to question whether my understanding of applications automatically accessing “publicly available information” is actually correct. I plan on doing more thorough research this weekend on such access and will update this post accordingly.

Update 2: See my full correction.

Original Post

I’ll admit, I was intrigued. Facebook informed me that a good friend had become a fan of page proclaiming that “94% of the people fall asleep immediately when seeing this picture”. That would be quite a picture. Who wouldn’t want to give it a shot? Over 270,000 people must have agreed, since that many people gave into the page’s demand that you become a fan before seeing the amazing photo. In the past I’ve simply ignored such scams, but this time, I did a bit of investigation and became intrigued once more.

I’ve come across many pages and applications that promise a tempting reward if you simply complete a few steps, which usually involve authorizing the app or becoming a fan of the page (I refuse to say “fanning the page”) and then inviting all of your friends to do the same. Rewards include tracking all visitors to your profile or getting a nice gift card. I would argue that it doesn’t take much evaluation to figure out why such scams are bogus, but untold Facebook users fall prey to them daily. Next time you’re tempted by a Facebook free lunch, remember that authorizing an application grants the developer access to all of your private info. Becoming a fan isn’t quite as drastic, but as you may have discovered, that’s rarely the last step in such offers.

Let’s get back to the hypnotizing pic. When you first load the page, it opens a tab tantalizingly entitled “THE PICTURE”. Ah, but before the powerful picture loads, you have to complete “two simple steps.” First, become a fan. But you have to click the button at the top – if you click the representation of it in the instructions, a dialog pops up saying you have to use the top button “to get access to the scantron hack.” Come again? Oh and the picture in that dialog is for another fan page entitled “How to Change Your Profile Layout.”

Anyway, become a fan and you’ll see step two: “Suggest this page to your friends.” Again, clicking the instructions brings up a dialog emphasizing you must invite at least 40 friends “to bypass the human verification gateway” (sounds high-tech). The picture this time is for some fan page involving “hot” girls. If you click step 3 (see the picture!) without inviting your friends first, you instead encounter the dreaded human verification gateway.

Of course, if you did annoy 40 friends first, I’m pretty sure you’d still see the gateway, which ironically offers for you to take a survey entitled “How DUMB are YOU?” As with so many similar pages, this page is entirely fake. First clue: the page has all wall posts (Correction: wall posts are hidden by default, but not disabled), reviews, and discussions disabled, so nowhere can “fans” actually share whether the trick worked or not.

Oh wait, “THE PICTURE” tab does include a comment box with testimonials from a few fans. However, if you actually click some of the profile links, you’ll find that the names don’t always match up. If you try adding your own comment, I can assure you from scanning network traffic that your feedback is not recorded. The comment box is simply a bit of static code made to look legitimate.

In fact, I assumed “THE PICTURE” tab was using the Static FBML application to load its contents. But the tab actually loads a special application called “sleeps” (whose URI includes the string “heyhaha”). What does “sleeps” do? It displays the page you see on “THE PICTURE” tab. Why bother with a custom app simply to load static code? When you visit an application, it has access to your “publicly available information” (for new readers, that includes your name, networks, friends list, location, content marked available to “Everyone,” pages you’re a fan of, etc.) without you ever clicking a button or granting specific permission. While only Facebook could say for certain, I’m guessing that “sleeps” takes advantage of this access and takes note of everyone who stops by. (See update at the top of this post.)

Applications have to get their code from somewhere besides Facebook, though, and “sleeps” loads it from the charmingly-named web site “”. By examining the full source code of the page, we can see exactly what happens when you click on fateful step 3. The page loads an inline frame that links to a file on called cpa.php.

As I’ve looked at various scams and attack over the last year or so, I’ve often encountered a particular type of trick that involves a CPAlead gateway. I have no idea what the motives are of the people behind CPAlead or how trustworthy their company is, but I can attest that CPAlead gateways are constantly exploited by untrustworthy people who are looking to make a quick buck. Our sleep-inducing fan page is no exception: that “human verification gateway” is simply another CPAlead setup.

The gateway asks you to complete a survey, which loads in a separate window. Once you’ve finished the “offer,” the gateway gets confirmation and grants you access to whatever it’s hiding. But finishing the survey will likely require you enter a mobile phone number, a very common online scam that will lead to plenty of unwanted charges on your next bill.

And I can save you the trouble – in this case, it’s not hard to discover what you would see once the gateway verified your humanity. If five racy images of “The sexiest girls from MAFIA WARS” make you fall asleep, then you’re one of the 94%. (Update: Apparently that’s another scam from the same people, and using the hypnotizing fan page may take you to a different destination – albeit still fake.)

I took the time to walk through this particular scam for two reasons. First, I find it fun to explore the code and figure out exactly what’s going on (CPAlead employs several obfuscation techniques in their JavaScript, for instance). Second, this story does have some important ramifications. At first, it may appear no different from many other online scams that pop up when a user clicks some flashy advertisement. As I said, I’ve encountered CPAlead many times before, and other sites have written at length about the dangers of offers that require your mobile phone number.

What makes this case different, however, is the Facebook integration. The scam artists behind this fan page quite literally know who their victims are. When you simply visit the page out of curiosity, the owners know you by name, along with a link to your profile and some basic information about you. This happens whether you fall for the offer scheme or not. (See update at the top of this post.)

Also, several clues in the fan page indicate that its owners run other pages with similar setups. Given the number of advertising-driven fake applications I’ve seen, it’s likely they have apps as well – and if you visit one of those apps, all of your private information can be connected to your profile. Facebook requires developers to destroy most of that data after 24 hours, but has no way of enforcing or verifying compliance with that rule. It’s entirely possible that the swindlers behind all these cons have built a sizable database of information on millions of Facebook users.

I’m not trying to simply spread FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) here. I cannot definitively prove these claims, but I think they are quite realistic based on my history of investigating Facebook applications and news stories on various scams and rogue apps I’ve tracked. And even if this scenario has not happened yet, the determination of past online scammers and the ease of executing such a setup lead me to believe it’s only a matter of time.

Access Facebook Data Without Logging in to Facebook

(N.B.: This is not an April Fool’s joke.)

Programmer Pete Warden made headlines a few months ago after creating a dataset of public profile information from 210 million Facebook users. Warden gathered his data by crawling the public search pages of some users have enabled, and planned on releasing it to the public. But Facebook threatened legal action, prompting Warden to destroy the information rather than risk an expensive court battle.

While I’m sympathetic to the privacy implications that led some to criticize Warden’s planned release, I also think that exposing the data would be an effective way of awakening Facebook users to what’s possible with information now classified as public. And while Warden abided by Facebook’s demands, it’s only a matter of time before someone less compliant publishes a similar dataset. Besides, many search engines already have similar resources in their indexes.

I’ve previously demonstrated how much content is actually available for logged-in Facebook users through various techniques. But indexing all of that content would definitely violate Facebook’s terms of use. What about truly public data, though, that’s accessible even to anonymous Facebook visitors and search engines? How much information can be seen without logging in?

To answer that, I’ve created yet another bookmarklet, though this one is far more complex and will likely not yield many results for most user. This trick is more a proof of concept. If you’re trying to access private profile information, this tool will not help you.

The bookmarklet works by adding a bar of links to a public search page for a Facebook user. (Note that not all users allow a public search page to appear for their profile.) These links attempt to load public content for several of Facebook’s standard applications, including the user’s “Boxes” tab. In order to see anything, the user must at minimum (1) set the visibility of the given application to “everyone,” and (2) create content within the application marked as visible to “everyone.” Even then, you may not get any results – I’ve found that the photos application seems to only display a user’s “Profile Pictures” album if it is set to public.

To see the trick in action, Mark Zuckerberg, Robert Scoble, or Louis Gray.

Feedback and questions are welcome ( or comment below), but please note I publish this bookmarklet as a convenience and will likely not provide detailed technical support.

Update (April 12): A reader pointed out to me that the bookmarklet was not working on public search pages for users who do not have vanity URIs. I’ve now updated the code to work regardless of the URI format.

Facebook Allowed Automatic Data Sharing Last November

Proposed changes to Facebook’s governing documents would allow the service to automatically share certain data when users visit third-party web sites, a move drawing widespread criticism and concern. However, I took another look at changes Facebook made last year, and from what I read, the sort of behavior people are worried about is already allowed. Facebook’s current privacy policy was last revised December 9, 2009, but all of the sections referenced in this post were added on November 19, 2009.

First, let’s recap what Facebook considers publicly available information:

Certain categories of information such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are considered publicly available, and therefore do not have privacy settings. You can limit the ability of others to find this information on third party search engines through your search privacy settings.

This also applies to content marked “everyone,” though without the search engine exception:

Information set to “everyone” is publicly available information, may be accessed by everyone on the Internet (including people not logged into Facebook), is subject to indexing by third party search engines, may be associated with you outside of Facebook (such as when you visit other sites on the internet), and may be imported and exported by us and others without privacy limitations.

The policy goes on to discuss how this applies to “Facebook-enhanced” applications and websites, which are previously defined as applications using the Facebook Platform or sites using Facebook Connect (and also notes earlier that “in order to personalize the process of connecting, we may receive a limited amount of information even before you authorize the application or website”). Here’s the relevant section, with my emphasis added:

As mentioned above, we do not own or operate Facebook-enhanced applications or websites. That means that when you visit Facebook-enhanced applications and websites you are making your Facebook information available to someone other than Facebook. To help those applications and sites operate, they receive publicly available information automatically when you visit them, and additional information when you formally authorize or connect your Facebook account with them.

In other words, the current Facebook privacy policy already allows your “publicly available information,” which includes your name, gender, geographic region, friends list, fan pages, and your content marked “everyone,” to be automatically shared with external web sites when you visit them. The only thing apparently preventing this from happening right now is technology – Facebook has not yet rolled out an official means for Facebook Connect sites to automatically access such data. Apparently they soon plan on adding that technology for certain “pre-approved” sites, an update which the newer governing documents make more explicit.

How Facebook is Adding an Identity Layer to the Internet

In what may become the next major privacy controversy for Facebook, the company has announced plans to automatically share certain information when a Facebook user visits certain “pre-approved” sites. In clarifying the feature, a spokesperson told VentureBeat that people should “think about Facebook Connect, but the user gets that experience when they arrive at the site rather than after clicking Connect.”

Given the way Facebook has repeatedly described “publicly available information” (PAI) since last fall’s privacy changes, this update is actually a logical next step for the company. Under a strict interpretation of Facebook’s policies, nothing would prevent a site from making use of such information already. Only technological barriers currently block the information flow – specifically, a site doesn’t automatically know who you are on Facebook when you visit.

At least, so it would seem. Researchers have already outlined ways that sites can infer a visitor’s social networking profile from other tracking mechanisms. In some ways, the new Facebook auto-connect simply builds on cookies and inline frames, the sources of earlier online privacy controversies. Furthermore, several security researchers have demonstrated exploits that led to data leakage. Nitesh Dhanjani demonstrated earlier this year that an authentication issue could give sites automatic access to the PAI of visitors, and just this week I reported to Facebook a vulnerability in their Platform that would allow sites to silently harvest all of a user’s profile information (details pending a patch).

Given the amount of data already flowing to Facebook applications and Facebook Connect sites (as well as their advertisers), the company’s moves towards more and more public sharing, and the history of privacy/security problems on the Facebook Platform, I’ve long argued that Facebook users should treat all of their content on the site as public. But Facebook has worked hard to maintain user trust, even making some content appear to be more private than it actually is. When I first discussed accessing public but hidden photo albums last December, I commented, “Making the albums hard to find gives an illusion of privacy and only delays any rude awakenings that may come from users who have inadvertently shared private photos.”

Now it may seem that Facebook users will finally understand the ramifications of default privacy settings. But the new system will probably be fairly subtle at first. Some users will find it creepy to be greeted on other sites by name, but such information will probably appear in a distinct, Facebook-labeled box (i.e., a Facebook Widget) to let a user know where the content comes from and make it still seem somewhat separate from the rest of the site. On the backend, though, the site will have access to the user’s public data.

What users may not realize is how much data they’re already sharing. This new style of Facebook Connect actually mirrors the behavior of Facebook itself. When you visit a Facebook application for the first time, it automatically knows who you are and can access your public data. (Correction: This only occurs in certain circumstances; more information here.) When you then click “Allow” to authorize the app, you give it access to all of your private data. Currently, an external web site knows nothing about you until you click “Connect.” If you do click, it has the same access to your private data as an authorized application. Now, Facebook is letting sites initially act like new applications by giving them access to your public data prior to full authorization.

In discussing the Facebook Platform, Anil Dash gave this analogy: “Think of the web, of the Internet itself, as water. Proprietary platforms based on the web are ice cubes. They can, for a time, suspend themselves above the web at large. But over time, they only ever melt into the water.” Depending on your perspective, either Facebook is finally melting into the water or the Web turned out to be the ice cube. With an automatic Connect system and the Open Graph API, Facebook is expanding its Platform to the rest of the Web. The only major difference between a Facebook-enabled web site and an actual Facebook application may soon be the URI.

You can start to get a sense of how this expansion may look by reading proposed changes to the service’s governing documents (see Inside Facebook’s excellent analysis):

We may also make information about the location of your computer or access device and your age available to applications and websites in order to help them implement appropriate security measures and control the distribution of age-appropriate content.

Currently, many sites hosting pornographic content will ask visitors to click a link verifying they are at least 18 or 21 before loading the material. With Facebook, the site could simply check your profile information first. Media companies worry about visitors accessing content outside of a given country; perhaps soon they can use your Facebook information to check your location.

Granted, providing fake details on your Facebook could easily foil some of these checks, but in many cases, that’s hardly different from lying about your age when you click or using a routing service to mask your location. Also, since if interact with friends on Facebook, you have a greater incentive to keep some information accurate. Facebook also reserves the right to terminate your account if you provide false profile information (despite also suggesting this strategy as a protection against identity theft).

My point is not to suggest that porn sites will soon be on Facebook’s “pre-approved” list or that Hulu would trust your profile over geographic IP data. I simply give these hypothetical scenarios to illustrate a larger trend: for better or for worse, your Facebook profile is becoming a virtual ID card.

Adding an identity layer to the Internet is not a new idea, but this may be the first time a system finds widespread adoption. Yet the Facebook identity model conflicts with many visions of how online identity should operate. “Open Stack” technologies, such as OpenID and OAuth, allow for federated setups. One of the first “Laws of Identity” by Kim Cameron states, “Digital identity systems must only reveal information identifying a user with the user’s consent.” Much of the consent in Facebook’s system comes from accepting the site’s terms at sign-up; many users will likely think that an opt-out Connect model violates Cameron’s principle.

And ultimately, user perception will be key to Facebook finding acceptance of its new endeavor. As social media researcher danah boyd discussed in her SXSW keynote, services with nothing technologically wrong can still disrupt social expectations (e.g. Google Buzz). (I rank the entire talk as must-read material for anyone working in the social networking space, but I’m only focusing on a few points here.) She also made a noteworthy distinction that I think will come up often as Facebook evolves:

Keep in mind that people don’t always make material publicly accessible because they want the world to see it….

Just because something is publicly accessible does not mean that people want it to be publicized. Making something that is public more public is a violation of privacy.

I think this distinction will be severely tested as the availability of Facebook data increases. I don’t dispute boyd’s evaluation, but coming from the perspective of security research, I know that when data becomes publicly available, it’s only a matter of time before it gets publicized in some way. With the wealth of information stored on Facebook’s servers, the site is becoming a favorite of both advertisers and attackers. Already we’ve seen hacks and tricks that make public Facebook data more public (see above), and each new site that integrates with Facebook is a new attack surface.

I’ve been cussed out by visitors to my site who think that by publishing weaknesses in the Facebook Platform or exposing seemingly hidden content I’m assisting those who maliciously hack people’s profiles. But much of what I post attempts to raise awareness of potential privacy and security issues before they get exploited by black hats. I can guarantee you I’m not the only one looking for Facebook weaknesses.

And that’s part of what concerns me about boyd’s distinction. The same technology that makes content “public” makes it easy to aggregate and publicize. For example, Pete Warden recently announced that he had built a dataset of 215 million Facebook profiles that he planned to publish for research purposes. Facebook eventually threatened to sue, prompting him to destroy the data, but no technology stands in the way of someone else recreating the dataset for their own purposes. In fact, with Facebook’s auto-connect system and the possibility of lighter rules for data storage, web sites may soon inadvertently recreate the dataset.

I honestly don’t think that Facebook is evil or that they care nothing about user privacy. Their new identity layer will likely bring benefits to many users and provide sites with valuable features. But just as Facebook became successful through providing users with a more private experience, the Internet became successful in large part because of its anonymity. While many users are happy with their personal Facebook account being a place “where everyone knows your name,” many users also value the rest of the Internet not knowing if they’re a dog. And as danah boyd put it so well, “No matter how many times a privileged straight white male technology executive pronounces the death of privacy, Privacy Is Not Dead.”

Security pros use layered techniques, but so do attackers

For many years security professionals have advocated using layered safeguards to reduce the risk of threats. While many organizations do employ multiple technologies like firewalls, anti-virus and intrusion detection to try to stop hackers, these guys are getting very good at navigating our layers of security. It’s like the old Mario and Donkey Kong video games where you had to jump over land mines, climb ladders, wait for doors to open and avoid swinging obstacles to reach the bonus prizes.

As an example of how many layers they are able to traverse, consider the reported attack on a financial institution’s enterprise network, which started life as a hacked Facebook account. (Click HERE for the full story.)

To make a long story short the attackers did the following:

  1. They captured the Facebook credentials of an individual who worked for a financial institution
  2. They then scanned the user’s Facebook profile to find recent social events involving co-workers on Facebook (finding a company picnic)
  3. They then sent emails to multiple Facebook friends who were co-workers saying, “Hey, have a look at the pictures I took at the company picnic!”
  4. The emails contained links to malicious web pages that attempted to launch a keylogger on the victims’ computers.
  5. They then scanned the keystrokes of an employee whose laptop had become infected with the keylogger and found the authentication credentials for the corporate VPN
  6. They infiltrated the VPN and infected a computer inside the corporate perimeter and performed vulnerability scans around the network to find servers with sensitive information on them.

The attack lasted as long as 2 weeks. If the attackers’ vulnerability scans had not been so “noisy”, they may not have been noticed, and the company could have suffered severe losses in terms of costly data breaches and corrupted databases, as well as system repairs.

So, what will happen now? Will the company add another layer of security to prevent a similar attack in the future? Probably… and these attackers will probably move on to other organizations with a bit less security. The cat and mouse game continues.

What’s interesting in this story is that the initial attack on the employees’ Facebook friends is pretty hard to defend against, since nothing seemed out of the ordinary. There really was a corporate picnic!

What would you do next if you were a security manager at this financial institution?

1 3 4 5 6 7 25